We study the effect of analyst coverage on firms' innovation strategy and outcome.
Introduction
Long-term growth in profits depends significantly on firms' investment in innovation activities. 1 However, firms may not invest in innovation in an optimal way. Some distortions arise because the decisions as to whether and how to invest in innovation are not only affected by their long-term expected benefits but also by short-term considerations. Among the factors that may distort firms' incentives to innovate, the recent literature has highlighted the recommendations or reports issued by financial analysts. 2 The literature has identified two distinct effects through which analyst coverage influences firms' innovation activity. The information effect captures the impact of analysts on the information asymmetries between managers and the market. By reducing the information asymmetries, analyst coverage increases a CEO's incentives to innovate as it decreases both the possibility of market undervaluation of the investments in innovation and the firm's exposure to hostile takeovers (Stein, 1988; He and Tian, 2013) . The pressure effect is related to the disciplining role of financial analysts on managers. Missing analysts' earnings forecasts is usually punished by investors, which leads managers to focus on activities that improve earnings in the short run. Since investments in innovation do not usually generate short-term income, managers who are followed by market specialists may have an incentive to cut expenses related to innovation. (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002 ; Hazarika, Karpo, and Nahata, 2012; He and Tian, 2013) .
In this paper we contribute to our understanding of the effect of financial analysts on firm innovation by isolating the information and pressure effects of analysts in a unified framework. To do so, we study three different channels through which firms can invest in innovation, and show that the information and pressure effects affect each of these investment channels differently. We provide evidence that firms followed by more analysts adjust their innovation strategy to take advantage of the information effect while at the same time trying to mitigate the pressure effect. These adjustments have non-obvious consequences for the final outcome of firms' innovation.
The three innovation channels that we consider are: research and development (R&D) expenditures, acquisitions of other innovative firms, and investments in corporate venture capital (CVC) funds. R&D spending is the traditional way in which firms innovate, but firms are increasingly using external channels as a way to enhance innovation beyond organic R&D growth. Firms acquire other innovative firms to appropriate knowledge from sources beyond the boundaries of the firm (Sevilir and Tian, 2014) . Managers also view CVC investments as a window of opportunity to learn about the latest innovative ideas, which may be instrumental for increasing their firms' innovation productivity (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005) . Anecdotal evidence suggests that many firms think of acquisitions as a quick way to access innovation. For instance, in 2012, Oracle shelled out $1.92 billion for Taleo (an online recruiting platform), $300 million to acquire Vitrue (an enterprise social marketing platform), and undisclosed sums in another three firms. Similarly, evidence suggests that CEOs of innovative corporations understand the importance of investing in innovation through CVC funds to remain competitive or even to increase their market share. A prominent example is Google Ventures, which currently has $1.5 billion under management, and has invested in more than 250 companies since its inception in 2009. 3 We argue that the aforementioned information and pressure effects of analyst coverage vary across the different activities through which a firm innovates. First, in terms of the information effect, being followed by more analysts improves the visibility of any firm's investment in innovation. Indeed, one of the main roles of financial analysts is to process the information that they gather from firms and disseminate it to the market. However, analysts have more difficulties with processing information related to R&D decisions than that related to acquisitions and CVC because the former type of information is more opaque. Therefore, the informational role of analysts may be stronger for external innovation activities than for R&D. Second, in terms of the pressure effect, part of the role of financial analysts is to set short-term earnings targets for firms. These benchmarks create pressure for managers because investors have a negative reaction (i.e., stock prices drop) if the earnings targets are not met. Based on General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), all investments in R&D are expensed in the income statement, whereas acquisitions and CVC investments are usually capitalized. Thus, increased market pressure by analysts is more likely to distort investments in R&D because cutting R&D expenses immediately increases pre-tax earnings and may allow managers to achieve earnings targets. 4 In contrast, it should have a smaller impact on acquisitions or CVC because capitalized investments do not affect earnings in every accounting period. 5 3 As Roberts (2006) hihglights: "Despite having legions of talented engineers who believe that they can invent anything, these companies (Intel, Siemens, Motorola) know that they cannot develop all the technologies they need and realize that they need to tap innovation outside their company walls. Intel and the others typically view VC investing as one of three pillars of innovation, along with internal R&D and acquisitions." 4 The FAS2 regulation in the US on R&D expenditures does not allow a delay of R&D expense recognition. This means that cutting an R&D expense today has a real consequence because the investment cannot be undertaken today. 5 Acquisitions or CVC investments influence earnings through impairment loss. Such a loss exists if the fair value of acquired firms or CVC funds is lower than their costs, which may not happen for every
The previous arguments suggest the following hypotheses: the information effect of analyst coverage is smaller, while the pressure effect is larger for in-house R&D than for acquisitions and CVC. Since we argued that the information effect encourages innovation activities whereas the pressure effect discourages them, we expect analyst coverage to have a positive effect on external innovation and a negative effect on in-house R&D.
We measure the effects of financial analysts with the number of analysts that cover a firm, and we test the above hypotheses, taking into account the potential endogeneity in the coverage-innovation relationship. We use two identification strategies: an instrumental variables (henceforth IV) approach, and a difference-in-differences (henceforth DID) method.
We find that firms with more analyst coverage significantly reduce R&D expenses. More interestingly, our results show that firms followed by more analysts are more active in the acquisition market, they acquire more innovative firms, and they invest more through their CVC funds. These results confirm our hypotheses that in terms of in-house R&D expenses the pressure effect is stronger than the information effect, whereas for the external innovation channels, the information effect seems to dominate.
To better understand the nature of firms' change in innovation strategy due to analyst coverage, we study whether the increased investment in external innovation activities is due to a direct effect of analysts because of their ability to process and report information to the market, or to an indirect effect whereby firms increase external innovation to compensate for the reduction in in-house R&D (i.e., a substitution effect). 6 In the latter case, the increase in external innovation would be the result of analyst pressure rather than a consequence of their informational role. We find a positive direct effect of coverage on both future acquisitions and CVC, providing further support for the information effect.
Since our previous results provide evidence of both the positive and negative effects of financial analysts on firms' innovation strategy, we discuss their influence on firms' innovation outcomes. We find that firms with more financial analysts that do not change their in-house R&D spending nor increase their external innovation have lower future patents and citations. However, the negative effect of analysts is less strong for firms that cut R&D expenses, which suggests that analyst pressure might have a disciplining effect that leads managers to cut wasteful resources. Moreover, when firms engage in acquisitions and CVC investments, the negative effect of analysts is also offset so that firms' citations and patents are unaffected.
accounting period. 6 Several authors, including Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) , find complementarities between internal and external innovation activities. However, the resources a firm devotes to innovation are limited. The money devoted to one activity cannot be spent in another and, in this respect, internal and external innovation activities are substitutes (Dessyllas and Hughes, 2005 ) .
Finally, to provide more detailed evidence of the pressure effect of analyst coverage, we investigate whether the impact of financial analysts on firms' innovation activity depends on the difference between the earnings forecast set by analysts and the actual earnings per share (EPS) reported by firms. Consistent with the pressure effect hypothesis, we find a discontinuity around the earnings pressure threshold, which is the point at which the actual and the forecasted earnings per share coincide. Specifically, firms that match or beat analysts' benchmarks by less than 10 cents are more likely to have cut R&D than those that miss the target by less than 10 cents. However, we find that this negative effect occurs only in the year in which managers are under pressure, and does not propagate in the long-term.
Consistent with this finding, our results show that the immediate cut in R&D spending does not affect innovation in the long term.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our contribution to the literature. Section 3 presents the sample and data. Sections 4 and 5 present the empirical strategy and the baseline results. Section 6 studies the direct and indirect effects of the number of analysts. Section 7 discusses the results in terms of efficiency in innovation. Section 8 uses the difference between the actual earnings per share reported by firms and the analysts' consensus forecasts as another measure of analyst pressure. Section 9 concludes.
Relation to the existing literature
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the emerging literature on finance and innovation. There are relatively few papers that relate innovation to finance. A recent theoretical paper by Manso (2011) shows that the best way to motivate managers to innovate is by offering managerial contracts that tolerate failure in the short run and reward success in the long run. 7 Empirically, some papers analyze the effects of financial contracting like institutional ownership (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013) or corporate venture capital (Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian, 2014) on innovation. The closest paper to ours is a recent paper by He and Tian (2013) which shows that analyst coverage reduces firms' innovation output as measured by patents and citations. We contribute to this literature by studying the effect of analyst coverage on firms' innovation strategy, namely their choice of internal and external innovation, and the effects of these channels on the final innovation outcome.
We also add to the literature that studies the effect of financial markets on managerial myopia. Bushee (1998) finds that managers are more inclined to cut R&D expenses in response to a decrease in earnings and that this is more likely to happen when a large portion of institutional owners are non-dedicated (i.e., short-term) investors. A related paper by Yu (2008) finds, in contrast, that firms with more analysts manage their accrual-based earnings less, and recent work by Irani and Oesch (2016) suggests that managers decrease real earnings management but increase accrual manipulation when they are followed by more analysts. We contribute to the earnings management literature by studying the effect of analysts on firms' decisions to cut R&D expenses and its consequence on the innovation output.
Our manuscript also contributes to the literature that studies the governance role of financial analysts. The recent paper by Chen, Harford, and Lin (2015) shows a positive monitoring role of analysts: following a decrease in coverage shareholders value internal cash holdings less, their CEOs receive higher excess compensation, and they are more likely to engage in value-destroying acquisitions. A related paper by Derrien and Kecskés (2013) shows that a decrease in analyst coverage increases the cost of capital, which results in a decrease in firm investments such as acquisition expenses. 8 We relate to these papers in that we contrast the information and the pressure effects of financial analysts in the context of firms' innovation strategy and outcomes.
Our analysis is also related to Bena and Li (2014) , who study whether acquisition decisions are based on the innovative output of acquirers and targets. We contribute to their line of inquiry by studying the effect of analyst coverage on firms' acquisitions of innovative target firms. Finally, our paper relates to the study by Dushnitsky and Lennox (2005) that explores the conditions under which firms are likely to pursue equity investments in new (external) ventures as a way of sourcing innovative ideas, instead of investing in internal R&D. We advance on this topic by studying the effect of financial market analysts on the internal versus external decision to innovate.
3 Sample selection, variables, and summary statistics
Sample selection
The sample used in this paper includes information on US public firms for the period 1990 to 2012. We start with all the companies in Compustat during the specified period. We exclude financial and utilities firms (SIC codes between 4000 and 4999 and between 6000 and 6999), and firms with total assets less than $10 million. For the remaining firms we retrieve financial statements information from Compustat. We then merge these companies with the information from the rest of the databases. We obtain financial analyst information from 
Variable measurement

Proxies for investments in innovation
We identify three main channels that firms can use to invest in innovation. First, firms can invest in R&D activities to increase the share of their earnings dedicated to innovation, or cut R&D to reduce their innovation expenses. We measure the R&D activities using the continuous variable R&D Change, which is the difference between R&D expenses (scaled by total assets) of the current year and that of the previous year, 9 as well as the dummy variable R&D Cut, which is equal to 1 if firms' R&D expenses (scaled by total assets) are lower in the current year than in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. 10 Second, firms can acquire other innovative firms to obtain their innovation know-how, their innovative assets, and their patents. We measure firms' acquisition activity based on two variables. The first variable, Acquisition, is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm acquires one or more companies in a certain year, and 0 otherwise. To construct the second variable 9 The variable R&D Change is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate the effect of extreme values. 10 We do not replace missing R&D expenses with 0. This helps us overcome the fact that some firms might not report their R&D expenditures in their financial statements for strategic reasons. These firms have a missing value for their R&D expenses in the Compustat database. By omitting them, we minimize the bias in the estimated effect. Moreover, we exclude those observations with a reported R&D expense of zero in two sequential years because, by definition, it is not possible to cut R&D expenses in this case.
we take the raw number of acquisitions and set to zero the firm-year observations without available acquisitions information. We then compute the LnAcquisitions variable by taking the natural logarithm of one plus the number of acquisitions according to the previous explanation.
To investigate whether firms acquire other companies for innovation reasons, we use two variables that are proxies for the innovativeness of the acquired firms. We retrieve the names of the acquired firms from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database, and then we manually identify the acquired firms' patents and citations in the NBER patents database. We calculate the accumulated number of patents (i.e., the stock of patents) and the accumulated number of citations (i.e., the stock of citations) of the target firms each year up to the year they are acquired. The variable LnTargPatent (LnTargCite) measures the average number of accumulated patents (citations) of all target firms acquired by a firm that
year. Since the NBER patent database only includes patents that were granted, there is only partial coverage of the patents filed in recent years. Therefore, we exclude observations after 2005 in the regressions that require patent or citation information. In addition, the NBER patent database suffers from two types of truncation problems. First, the lag between patent application and patent grants is two years on average but the variation is large. Second, the database ends in 2006. Thus, recent patents have less time to accumulate citations than patents obtained in earlier years. We address these two problems by using the "timetechnology class fixed effect" method (see Trajtenberg, 2001, and Atanassov, 2013) , in which patents (citations) are scaled by the average number of patents (citations) in the same technology class in the same year. 11 Finally, firms can set up CVC funds to invest in startups related to their core business as a way to gain a window to the latest innovations. We define two variables that measure CVC investment. The first one, CVC Setup, is a dummy equal to 1 the first year in which the firm invests resources in its CVC fund, and 0 before that. Since this variable is meant to capture firms' decisions to set up a CVC fund, we put a missing value to the firm-years after the firm has made its first investment in start-ups. We also build the dummy variable CVC Investments, which is equal to 1 every year a CVC fund invests, and 0 otherwise. This variable captures firms' decisions to make investments in startups subsequently after their CVC fund has been set up. 12 
Analyst coverage
Analyst coverage is the main independent variable in our regressions. We measure analyst coverage with the number of analysts that issue forecasts for a firm. Following the literature, we compute a raw measure of the number of analysts (Coverage) as the mean of the 12 monthly numbers of earnings forecasts that a firm receives annually, from the I/B/E/S summary file. We use this number because most analysts issue at least one earnings forecast for a firm in a year, and the majority of them issue at most one earnings forecast each month (He and Tian, 2013) . 13 The firm-years in which firms are not followed by financial analysts have missing information in the I/B/E/S database. We set to zero the firm-year observations with missing values (Chang, Dasgupta and Hilary, 2006; Hameed, et al., 2015) . Our final measure of the number of analysts is LnCoverage, which is the natural logarithm of one plus the raw measure of coverage computed before.
In section 8, we further study the pressure effect of analyst coverage based on the variable EPSP, which is the difference between the actual earnings per share (EPS) reported by firms and the analysts' consensus forecasts. EPS pressure (EPSP ) is equal to zero when firms exactly match analysts' consensus forecast. It is positive (negative) when firms beat (miss) the consensus forecast.
Control variables
Following the finance and innovation literature, we control for a rich set of firm and industry characteristics that are likely to affect firms' innovation strategy. The usual control variables are: Firm Size, which is the natural logarithm of the total assets; R&D, which is the R&D expenses scaled by total assets; Firm Age, which is the number of years a firm has existed in Compustat; Leverage, which is the ratio of firm debt to total assets; Cash, which is firms' cash scaled by total assets; Profitability, measured by the return on equity (ROE);
Tobin's Q, which measures firm's growth opportunities; PPE, which is firm Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) scaled by total assets; Capex, which is capital expenditures scaled by total assets; and the KZ Index which measures financial constraints (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997 ). In addition, Bushee (1998), Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013), and Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) show that institutional ownership is likely to affect firms' investment in innovation. We include the control variable InstOwn, which is the percentage of institutional ownership in the firm each year. Also, Aghion et al. (2005) argue that product market competition affects innovation and that the effect may be non-linear. We include the variables HHI, which is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, to measure industry concentration, and HHI 2 , which is the square of the previous variable. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize Profitability, Tobin's Q, and the KZ Index at the 1st and 99th percentiles. A detailed definition of all the variables used in our analysis is provided in Table 1 . Table 2 provides summary statistics of all the variables used in our analysis. Regarding R&D expenditures, the average ratio of R&D to total assets is 8.2% in our sample, and the average change in that ratio is about 0.2 percentage points. Also, approximately 48% of firms in our sample cut their R&D expenses during the period studied. In terms of acquisitions, 15.2% of firms in our sample are involved in acquisition deals in a given year and, on average, 0.20 companies are acquired. 14 For those firms that acquire during our sample period (i.e., 3, 990 firm-years), the average accumulated number of patents of the target firms is 4.81 and the corresponding number of citations is 16.82. 15 Also, 0.3% of the firms set up CVC funds in a given year, and around 1.4% invest in startup companies during the sample period.
Summary statistics
In terms of coverage, firms in our sample are followed by about six analysts per year on average. Regarding the EPSP measure, the summary statistics show that earnings forecasts are generally accurate since the median distance between the EPS analyst forecasts and actual earnings is 0. Also, firms are more likely to report positive EPSP (51% of the sample) than negative (42% of the sample). These statistics are consistent with other studies like Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund (2016). Table 2 enter as controls in our regressions. Firms in our sample have, on average, $3.17 billion total assets, which corresponds to an average size of 5.9. Firms in our sample are 19.3 years old, and have a leverage ratio of 18.7%, a ratio of cash to assets of 23.4%, a return on equity of 17.2%, a ratio of tangible assets to total assets of 22.4%, a ratio of capital expenditures to total assets of 5.2%, a proportion of institutional owners of 42.8%, a Tobin's Q of 2.96, a KZ Index of −7.4, and the average industry concentration in our sample is 28.8%.
The remaining variables in
Empirical strategy
To assess how analyst coverage affects firms' innovation strategy, we base our estimations on both ordinary least squares (OLS) 16 and instrumental variables (IV). Below, we also check the robustness of our results with a difference-in-differences (DID) approach. We start by estimating the following model using OLS:
where subindexes i and t stand for firm and time. The dependent variable InnovStrategy (i,t+k) corresponds to our different measures of firms' innovation strategy. We use several mea- The potential endogeneity problems in the analyst-innovation relationship can lead to a bias in the OLS estimates. Endogeneity in this relationship can occur in the form of both omitted variables and reverse causality. An omitted variables problem occurs if an unobservable firm characteristic affects both the innovation strategy and the number of analysts following a firm. For instance, managerial propensity for empire building may lead firms to invest more in acquisitions and CVC. At the same time, empire building managers may attract more financial analysts because this type of managers has a preference for media attention. Reverse causality might take place if, for example, firms that are more involved in acquisitions attract more analysts because they are more active in the M&A market.
We address these endogeneity concerns mainly with an instrumental variables approach and fixed effects. We will also use a quasi-natural experiment as a robustness check. The reverse causality problem is also attenuated by the fact that our independent variables are lagged one or two periods with respect to the dependent variable.
Our instrument, Expected Coverage, was first introduced by Yu (2008) and exploits exogenous variation in analyst coverage. 17 This instrument uses changes in the number of analysts that work for brokerage houses over time. As argued by Yu (2008) , the number of analysts that a brokerage house employs depends on the performance or profitability of the broker house but, in principle, it does not depend on the characteristics of the covered firms. In our case, it is also unlikely that the number of analysts that work for a brokerage house depends on the innovation strategy of the firms it covers. Therefore, a change in firms' analyst coverage driven by a change in the size of the brokerage houses covering the firm can be considered exogenous.
Following Yu (2008) , we construct the instrumental variable as follows:
where ExpCoverage (i,t,j) is the expected coverage of firm i in year t from brokerage house j. Brokersize (t,j) and Brokersize (0,j) are the number of analysts employed by broker j in year t and in the benchmark year 0, respectively. We use year 1990 as the benchmark
year because it is the starting year of our sample. Coverage (i,0,j) is the number of analysts from broker j following firm i in year 0. Hence, ExpCoverage (i,t,j) measures the expected number of analysts from broker j that can cover a firm i in a given year t according to the brokerage house size in that year with respect to the initial year. The instrumental variable
is the total expected number of analysts of firm i from all the broker houses in year t. We follow the literature and drop all observations in the benchmark year (1990) since the expected coverage for that year is 1 by construction. 18 We use ExpCoverage (i,t) to instrument the endogenous variable LnCoverage (i,t) in model (1) above and we estimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). 17 The instrument has been used in other recent studies like He and Tian (2013), Irani and Oesch (2016), and Chen, Harford, and Lin (2015). 18 As pointed out by Yu (2008) , a concern with this instrument is that after a decrease in the broker house size the broker house decides which firms to stop covering, which could introduce a selection problem. However, whereas this could pose a problem for the realized coverage, it does not affect the instrument, which measures the tendency to keep covering a firm before any actual termination decision is made.
Baseline results
In this section we estimate the effect of the number of analysts on R&D expenditures, acquisition activity, and CVC investments using the empirical strategy explained above.
As we argued in the introduction, financial analysts both exert pressure on managers (the pressure effect) and provide information to markets (the information effect). We expect financial analysts to have a differential effect on the channel that firms use to innovate depending on whether the pressure or information effect dominates. On the one hand, a larger number of analysts may exert more pressure on managers to meet analysts' earnings forecasts. The reason is that stock markets react negatively when firms miss the earnings targets set by analysts, which causes stock prices to drop. The more analysts following a firm, the more exposed the firm is in the market, and the larger the expected price drop.
Based on the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) R&D costs are expensed in firms' income statement whereas acquisitions and CVC investments are capitalized. Since cost expenses directly affect earnings but capitalizations do not, we postulate that due to the pressure effect managers are more likely to manipulate earnings by cutting in-house R&D spending (the so-called real earnings management) than by modifying their acquisitions or CVC strategy. On the other hand, a larger number of analysts increases firms' visibility in the market and hence has the potential for a greater reduction of the asymmetric information problems between firms and investors. We postulate that firms' decisions concerning R&D expenditures are more difficult to assess by financial analysts than CVC or acquisitions due to the more opaque nature of the former. As a result, due to the information effect, we expect analysts to have a positive effect on firms' investment in external innovation whereas in-house R&D should be affected to a lesser extent.
Number of analysts and R&D expenditures
We first discuss the effect of financial analysts on firms' R&D expenses. The estimated results are presented in Table 3 . Panel A of Table 3 reports the OLS results and panel B
shows the results of the IV strategy. 19 The first two columns of panel A report the effect of analyst coverage at year t on the ExpCoverage, is positive and significant at the 1% level, which is consistent with previous work. The large t-statistic (16.6) confirms the explanatory power of our instrument. Also, the F-statistic of the regression is around 305, which is comfortably above the critical value (of 10) suggested by Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) for one instrument. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis that the expected coverage is a weak instrument.
Both the OLS and IV results of Table 3 indicate that firms followed by more analysts significantly reduce their expenses in R&D activities one and two years ahead. Specifically, an increase of one analyst, for a firm that initially had one analyst, decreases the change in R&D expenses by about 0.5 percentage points on average, and it increases the likelihood of cutting future R&D expenses by about 4.4 percentage points. 20 Comparing the two panels of Table 3 , we can see that the coefficients of analyst coverage tend to be larger in the IV regressions, suggesting that endogeneity biases the OLS coefficients downwards. 21 The rest of the covariates in the regressions have the expected sign. For example, firms with more cash are more likely to increase (and less likely to cut) R&D, firms with more fixed assets are less likely to increase (or more likely to cut) R&D, and firms with higher growth opportunities are more likely to increase (or less likely to cut) R&D.
Number of analysts and acquisitions
Here, we discuss the effect of financial analysts on firms' acquisition strategy. We first study the effect on the number of acquisitions and then on the innovativeness of the acquired firms. Table 4 reports both the OLS and IV regression results regarding the likelihood of acquiring firms and the number of acquired firms. 22 The results show that firms followed by more analysts are more likely to acquire other firms, and to acquire a larger number of firms. In the IV regressions, results are significant at the 1% level one year forward, and at the 10% level two years forward, for both variables. Specifically, if for example the number 20 An increase of one analyst represents an increase of 100% for a company that initially has one analyst. The 4.4 percentage points in the case of R&D Cut is computed as follows: 0.064ln((1 + 1)/1) = 0.044. The increase would be smaller for companies with initially more analysts. For example, for an average company (with six analysts), an additional analyst increases the likelihood of cutting R&D by about 1 percentage point. 21 For example, for our dependent variable R&D Cut one year ahead, the coefficient in the OLS regression is 0.035 and it becomes 0.064 in the IV estimation. This suggests that an omitted variable might be simultaneously affecting coverage and R&D expenses, causing a downward bias. For instance, if managerial style is an omitted time-varying firm-level variable, more conservative managers might be more likely to cut R&D expenses, but this type of more conservative management may also be less attractive to analysts. Alternatively, the downward bias might also be the result of measurement error. 22 We report the first-stage estimation results of IV regressions on acquisition activities in the first column of panel B. The result is very similar to that of Table 3 , panel B. The coefficient of ExpCoverage, is positive and significant at the 1% level and the t-statistic is 19.68. The F-static is around 411. of analysts increases from 1 to 2, the likelihood of acquiring other firms one year later increases by 3.9 percentage points, and the number of acquired companies increases by about 4%. These effects are economically significant since the average likelihood of acquisitions in our sample is 15.2%, and the average number of acquired firms is 0.2.
Regarding the control variables, Table 4 shows that smaller and less leveraged firms are more likely to invest in acquisitions. Firms with a lower level of initial R&D expenses, more liquidity, more profitability, more growth opportunities, less financial constraints, and a larger percentage of institutional investors are also more likely to acquire other firms.
The previous results indicate that financial analysts lead firms to acquire other firms.
However, acquisitions need not be part of firms' innovation strategy but rather part of, for instance, their growth strategy that is unrelated to innovation, or even an empire-building strategy that reduces firm value. 23 We study the influence of financial analysts on firms' innovation strategy through acquisitions by focusing on the innovativeness of the acquired companies.
We measure the innovative value of the acquired targets using the number of accumulated patents and citations up to the moment when they were acquired. The patents and citations of a target reflect not only the quality of the innovation knowledge it owns but also its absorptive capacity and innovation potential. Therefore, if firms acquire with the intention of increasing their innovation capabilities, they should acquire firms with a higher number of patents and citations. In contrast, if acquisitions are made for other reasons, we should find either no effect or a negative effect on the innovation quality of the acquired firms.
We use a specification of the IV model presented above in which we include industry fixed effects instead of firm fixed effects because our sample is reduced to only those firms that acquire other companies (i.e., around 3,990 observations, an average of 2 observations per firm). Table 5 indicates a positive and significant (at the 5% level) influence of analysts on the innovativeness of acquired firms one and two years forward. Specifically, if the number of analysts increases from one to two, the average number of accumulated patents (citations) of target firms increases by 21.9% (38.1%) one year ahead. These results, together with those of Table 4 presented above, imply that analysts encourage firms to not only acquire more companies, but also more innovative ones.
Number of analysts and CVC investments
In this section we discuss the effect of analysts on firms' CVC investments. Results are reported in Table 6 . The estimated IV coefficients in panel B suggest that being followed by more analysts increases the likelihood of firms setting up a CVC fund and making subsequent investments in startups one and two years ahead. This positive effect is statistically significant at the 1% level for both CVC Setup and CVC Investments. In particular, if the number of analysts increases from one to two, the probability of setting up CVC funds and investing in startups in the future is 0.6 percentage points and 2.1 percentage points higher, respectively. After correcting for the endogeneity problem with the IV approach, financial analysts have a stronger positive effect on firms' CVC setups and investments compared to that of the OLS estimation, suggesting that OLS results are downward biased. 24 By looking at the control variables we can see that investing in CVC funds is specific to older firms and firms with more growth opportunities.
Overall, our previous results show that stock market analysts tend to discourage R&D spending while they encourage external innovation in the form of acquisitions and CVC investments. These results are in line with our previous arguments and suggest that regarding R&D spending the pressure effect dominates, while for acquisitions and CVC investments the information effect tends to dominate.
Robustness: A quasi-natural experiment
We use a quasi-natural experiment to further address endogeneity concerns in the coverageinnovation relationship. Specifically, we follow Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) and others 25 and use brokerage house mergers as a source of an exogenous decrease in the number of analysts. 26 We also follow these papers to construct our treated and control samples (a detailed explanation of this process can be found in Appendix B).
We estimate the following difference-in-differences model, which takes into account multiple merger events:
where InnovStrategy (i,m,t) is one of our several innovation strategy variables for firm i, which is either a treatment or a control in the merger event m, in year t. T reated (i,m) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm i is affected by a given merger event m, and P ost (m,t) is an indicator variable equal to 1 for a firm in the post-merger period of merger m. The coefficient β 3 is the DID coefficient and captures the effect of the decrease in analyst coverage after a merger on the innovation strategy of the treated firms relative to control firms. The variables α i , φ m , and δ t correspond to the firm, merger, and year fixed effects, respectively.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm-merger level to account for potential covariance of outcomes within firms over time. 27 Results are presented in Table 7 . We first use the above regression using analyst coverage as a dependent variable. The results of such a specification are presented in panel A, which shows that treated firms lose, on average, about one analyst in the first and second year after the merger relative to firms in the control group. Therefore, the DID coefficients of our regressions in panels B and C are capturing the effect of a decrease in coverage. The results of panels B and C in Table 7 correspond to our DID estimates using a sample constructed with a basic matching approach, and with a nearest neighbor matching, respectively. These matching techniques are explained in detail in Appendix B. The results in Table 7 generally show that the mergers of brokerage houses have a significant effect on the innovation strategy of firms one and two years after the mergers occur. Specifically, the DID coefficients show that after an exogenous drop in analyst coverage due to the mergers, firms are less likely to cut their R&D expenses, less likely to set up CVC funds, and less likely to acquire other firms. These effects are economically and statistically significant one and two years after the mergers, which is consistent with our OLS and IV results in the previous sections. 28 27 In a more conservative approach (untabulated), we allow the firm and year fixed effects to vary by cohort. The results of this approach are very similar to the reported results. 28 In the regressions where the dependent variable corresponds to the CVC Setup (columns (7) and (8)), we cannot include firm fixed effects due to the way in which the variable is defined (see variable definitions in Table 1 ). Since this variable is set to missing after firms have set up a CVC fund, taking into account the within-firm variation (i.e., including a firm fixed effect), creates a selection bias because only those firms that set up CVC funds after the merger events (i.e., those for which there is no missing data post-merger) are considered when computing the average effect. In other words, the missing data is correlated with the event.
To overcome this problem, we replace the firm fixed effects with the typical dummy variable for treated firms in the standard DID model. The variable Treated is equal to 1 for a firm affected by a merger, and 0 if the firm is unaffected. This variable is less conservative than our firm fixed effect (because it imposes the same intercept for all treated and all control firms), but it still captures differences in the treated and control firms pre-merger. The coefficient of this variable is untabulated, but it is positive and significant in all regressions, suggesting that treated firms are more likely to set up CVC funds pre-merger, relative to control firms.
Direct vs. indirect effect of the number of analysts
The previous sections show that analyst coverage leads firms to cut investments in R&D activities, to acquire other innovative firms, and to increase investments in start-up companies.
It seems clear that cutting R&D is the result of financial analyst pressure to meet earnings targets. However, the increase in innovative acquisitions and CVC investments could be due to two different effects. First, it could be driven by the informational role of analysts.
As we have argued, firms may have an additional incentive to make profitable investments in acquisitions and CVC when they are followed by more analysts because analysts provide reliable information to the market regarding firms' value-enhancing operations. Second, it could be due to the analyst pressure effect. Indeed, if firms are forced to decrease R&D expenditures to meet analysts' earnings forecasts, they may invest in external innovation in order to keep up with innovation and compensate for the in-house reduction in R&D.
Hence, the increase in external innovation could be the result of a direct -information-effect of analysts, or due to an indirect -pressure-effect that comes from substituting in-house R&D. We attempt to disentangle these effects in this section. Empirically, we model the two effects with an interaction term. We estimate the effect of analysts followed by a cut in R&D expenditures on external innovation using the following equation:
where subindex i stands for firm, t stands for time, and k can take two values, k ∈ {1, 2}. The dependent variable ExternalInnov (i,t+k) corresponds to our proxies for external innovation activities: acquisitions (Acquisition and LnAcquisitions), and CVC (CVC Setup and CVC Investments). The coefficient β 1 captures the direct effect of financial analysts on external innovation, and the coefficient β 3 captures the indirect effect. According to our previous discussion, we expect the coefficient β 1 to be positive if analysts have an informational role that encourages firms to undertake value-enhancing acquisitions and CVC investments. We expect coefficient β 3 to be positive if analyst pressure leads managers to increase external innovative activities as a result of cutting R&D expenses. Alternatively, β 3 can be negative if firms also reduce external innovation after cutting internal R&D because with a smaller in-house R&D unit firms are less able to leverage the advantages of investing in innovation outside the firm. The coefficient β 2 captures the relationship between internal R&D and external innovation for firms that cut R&D but have no analyst coverage. We use the same set of covariates as in the baseline model and also include firm and year fixed effects. Errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. We estimate Equation (5) using 2SLS where the endogenous variable LnCoverage (i,t) is instrumented with our instrument in Equation (3).
We present the results in Table 8 . Panel A states the direct and indirect effect of analysts on acquisitions, panel B the results on the innovativeness of acquired firms, and panel C the results on CVC setup and investments. In the three panels, columns (1) and (3) Panel A shows that the number of analysts has a strong and positive direct effect on the decision to acquire other firms and on the number of firms acquired, which suggests that the reason why firms increase external innovation when they are followed by more analysts is to take advantage of the informational role of analysts. The coefficient of the interaction effect is negative in all the specifications, but only appears significant (at the 10% level) for the number of acquisitions two periods forward, which suggests that the earnings pressure by analysts might have some (weak) effect on firms' external innovation. Still, the interaction coefficients are significantly smaller in absolute terms than those of the direct effect. Hence, firms that cut R&D after being followed by more analysts increase their acquisition activity, although to a lesser extent than firms that do not cut R&D.
Panel B indicates that the positive effect of analysts on the innovativeness of acquired firms also comes from a direct effect related to analysts' informational role. Finally, panel C shows that financial analysts have a positive direct effect on the CVC setup and CVC investments one and two years ahead. This effect is significant at least at the 5% level. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and not significant. This indicates that the positive effect of financial analysts on CVC setups and investments can be attributed to their informational role.
Overall, our results indicate that for both external innovation channels the positive effect of analyst coverage is mainly due to a direct influence of analysts' actions than to an indirect effect due to the decrease in R&D. 29 29 We confirm these results with a multinomial logit regression model where our dependent variable is a categorical variable that captures the different possibilities of a firm's innovation strategy: doing only R&D, only making acquisitions, doing only CVC, or the various combinations among them. This model is tested with respect to the base outcome which is doing nothing. Our results show that analyst coverage makes it more likely that firms decrease R&D expenses, acquire other firms, and invest in CVC together with making acquisitions.
Discussion on efficiency
Our results above provide evidence of a pressure effect of analysts that leads firms to cut in-house R&D spending, and of an information effect that encourages firms to invest in innovation activities beyond the boundaries of the firm. Hence, when we take these different innovation channels into account, the final effect of analysts on firms' innovative outcome is, in principle, not clear. In this section we explore the consequences of the change in firms' innovation strategy due to analyst coverage on the final innovation outcome.
Firms that cut R&D should in principle see a reduction in their innovation output.
Indeed, if firms devote fewer resources to R&D, their number of patents and citations should decrease. However, analyst pressure may lead firms to cut R&D expenses only on those projects that are less productive or even wasteful. In this case, cutting R&D is efficient and it should have a minor or no effect on the innovation output. On the other hand, increasing acquisitions and CVC investments should help firms to develop and acquire new technologies, and improve their absorptive capacity. As a result, the firm should be able to produce more and better innovation output. Still, acquisitions may be related to firms' growth policy or empire-building strategies, and CVC investments might be directed solely to obtain financial returns. In these cases innovation output should be lower or unaffected.
We explore these ideas estimating the following model:
where i stands for firm, t stands for time, and k can take two values: k ∈ {3, 4}. The dependent variable InnovOutcome (i,t+k) corresponds to two proxies for innovation output:
LnP atents and LnCitations, which measure the yearly firm's number of granted patents and citations, respectively. The main independent variables are LnCoverage (i,t) , which corresponds to the number of analysts, the innovation strategy InnovStrategy (i,t+1) , which corresponds to firms' either cutting R&D, acquiring other firms, or investing in CVC, and their interaction. We also include our usual controls in X (i,t) as well as firm and year fixed effects. Errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. Table 9 presents the results of the effect of the number of analysts and cutting R&D (panel A), acquiring other firms (panel B), or investing in CVC (panel C) on the innovation outcome. In the three panels, the coefficient of LnCoverage (i,t) is always negative and significant in general. This means that the number of analysts covering a firm has a negative effect on future patents and citations for those firms that do not cut R&D, or do not invest in acquisitions or CVC. This result is in line with previous findings by He and Tian (2013) .
Panel A also shows that cutting R&D for firms that are not followed by analysts has a negative effect, although this is only significant for citations three years forward. Similarly, panels B and C show that the effect of acquisitions and CVC investments on patents and citations for firms that are not covered by analysts is also negative. In these cases, the effects are highly significant, meaning that when firms are not covered by analysts they might invest in acquisitions and CVC for reasons other than promoting innovation (like financial or empire-building motives) that in turn may be harmful for their innovation output.
The coefficients of the interaction terms are even more interesting. In panel A, cutting R&D when being followed by more analysts has a negative effect on patents, but a positive effect on patent quality (i.e., citations). We interpret these results as follows: analyst pressure induces myopic behavior in managers that leads them to cut in-house R&D, and this in turn has a negative effect on patents. However, it may discipline managers to cut wasteful R&D resources and this has a beneficial effect because workers can spend more time on the crucial innovations, which leads to a higher quality of patents. In panels B and C, the interaction effects are positive and highly significant, which provides evidence that the negative effect of analysts on innovation is reduced if firms increase innovative acquisitions (panel B), and invest in innovative startups (panel C). In fact, the total effect of analyst coverage, which is given by the sum of coefficients β 1 + β 3 , is in some cases close to zero or even positive. Therefore, by investing in external innovation activities the firms may more than offset the negative effect on innovation due to the presence of analysts.
Earnings per share pressure and innovation strategy
In this section we try to isolate the pressure effect of analysts by using another measure of analyst pressure, namely the difference between the actual earnings per share (EPS) reported by firms and the analysts' consensus forecasts. Whereas we think that this might be a less noisy measure of analyst pressure than the number of analysts, we argue that the EPS pressure measure is likely to affect only firms' R&D decisions and only in the shortterm. Specifically, we measure earnings pressure as the difference between the firm's end of fiscal year realized EPS and the first month of the last quarter's EPS consensus forecast made by analysts. Due to the short-term nature of this measure and its direct relationship to earnings, we expect external innovation activities to be unaffected by the managers' willingness to meet earnings benchmarks.
In what follows, we first uncover a discontinuity in the likelihood of decreasing R&D expenditures around an earnings pressure threshold, and we then exploit this discontinuity to test whether cutting R&D expenses has a causal effect on firms' innovation outcomes. Figure 1 presents graphical evidence that managers modify R&D expenses to meet analysts' consensus forecasts. Specifically, it shows that firms that match or beat the analyst consensus forecasts are more likely to have cut R&D expenses than the firms that miss the forecasts. For example, the probability of cutting R&D increases from 45% to around 52% when the sign of the EPSP changes from negative to positive. This suggests the presence of a discontinuity in firms' R&D expenses around the EPSP zero threshold.
We formally analyze this discontinuity estimating the following regression:
where R&D (i.t) is either R&D Change or R&D Cut. I M atchBeat(i,t) is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that match or beat analyst consensus forecasts and 0 for firms that miss them, and EP SP (i,t) is the amount of EPS pressure. We use a polynomial functional form and interactions so as not to impose restrictions on the underlying conditional mean functions (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 30 We also include our usual battery of controls in X (i,t) as well as firm and year fixed effects. Errors are robust and clustered at the firm level. Table 10 , panel A reports the results of regression (7) . They show that matching or beating analysts' consensus forecasts significantly predicts changes in firms' R&D. Specifically, the decrease in R&D expenses (scaled by total assets) for firms that match or beat analysts' forecasts is 0.2 percentage points lower than that of firms that miss forecasts (columns (1) and (2)), and the former is 4 percentage points more likely to cut R&D (columns (4) and (5)) than the latter. Given that the average probability of cutting R&D is 49.7% and the average change in R&D expenses is −0.3%, these are both economically significant effects.
The results of Table 10 also show that changing the R&D to match or beat analysts' forecasts is only a short-term effect. Indeed, the point estimates of our main indicator variable in columns (3) and (6), which capture the effect of matching or beating forecasts on firms'
R&D behavior in the future, are not significant.
The key identification assumption behind the previous exercise is that there are no other discontinuous differences in firm characteristics around the zero EPS pressure threshold. 30 We obtain the same results if we use a 2nd degree or a 1st degree polynomial.
This assumption is usually tested by studying whether there are pre-existing differences in the strategies of firms that fall on either side of the threshold. We estimate a modified version of the above equation (by lagging the dependent variable) to test for parallel trends.
Results are reported in Table B .3 in Appendix B. As can be seen, firms with small positive and small negative EPS pressure have very similar pre-existing characteristics; thus, the parallel trends assumption is satisfied.
We now turn to estimate the effect of cutting R&D expenses in the short-term due to EPS pressure on firms' innovation outcomes. We do this with a fuzzy regression discontinuity framework where we exploit our previously reported discontinuity in R&D around the zero EPSP threshold. We estimate the following two-stage least squares regression:
where R&Dcut (i,t) corresponds to the estimated values of a first-stage regression where we include I M atchBeat(i,t) as an instrument. Under the identification assumption that there are no other discontinuous differences in firm characteristics around the zero threshold, the coefficient γ 1 captures a causal effect. Regression (8) also includes a control of the amount of pressure, and its interaction with the binary variable that indicates matchers and beaters versus missers. 31 To isolate any differences around the zero threshold, we restrict the sample to a small window of 10 cents (i.e., −0.10 < EP SP < 0.10). The regression includes year and industry fixed effects as well as clustered errors at the firm level.
Results are reported in panel B of Table 10 . They show that cutting R&D does not influence firms' innovative outcome in the long term. This suggests that a decrease in R&D expenses that is due to the managers' willingness to match or beat analysts' forecasts in the current period is only a short-term effect.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the effect of analyst coverage on three main channels that firms can use to innovate, namely internal R&D spending, acquisitions of other innovative firms, and investment in Corporate Venture Capital. There are two channels through which financial market analysts influence firms' innovation strategy: a pressure effect and an information effect. Analysts put pressure on firms because they issue earnings forecasts for firms to meet, and they reduce information asymmetries between firms and investors because they 31 Our results are robust to not including this interaction.
provide reliable information about firms' activities to the market.
We find evidence that firms followed by more financial analysts are more likely to cut their internal R&D programs but they are also more likely to start or increase CVC investments and to acquire other innovative firms. We also find that analyst coverage has a negative effect on innovation as measured by the number of patents and citations; however, this negative effect is reduced, or even offset, for firms that engage in external innovation. Overall, our results highlight that firms adjust their innovation strategy when they are followed by more analysts so as to isolate their innovation productivity from the potentially harmful pressure effect of analysts, while taking advantage of their informational effect.
By studying the effect of financial analysts on several innovation strategies, our results put the previous findings about the negative effect of financial analysts (like Bushee, 1998, and He and Tian, 2013) in perspective: while an increase in market pressure leads to more cuts in internal R&D, which reduces innovation, the accompanying increase in information encourages external innovation, which moderates the negative effect. ( 6) at t minus ratio of R&D expenses to total assets at t − 1
A Appendix A
R&D Cut
Indicator variable equal to 1 if R&D ( 46) (scaled by total assets ( 6)) at t is lower than that at t − 1, and 0 otherwise Acquisition Indicator variable equal to 1 when a firm acquires one or more other companies, and 0 otherwise
LnAcquisitions
Natural logarithm of (one plus) the number of target companies acquired
CVC Setup
Indicator variable equal to 1 the year in which CVC fund makes its first investment, and 0 for the years preceding the first investment
CVC Investments
Indicator variable equal to 1 for each year in which CVC fund invests in a startup, and 0 otherwise and IV 2SLS (panel B) regression results of the effect of the number of analysts on R&D expenses one and two years ahead. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses. * * * , * * , and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1 .
LnCoverage −0.009 * * * −0.004 * * * 0.035 * * * 0.026 * * * (0.001) (0 Tobin'sQ 0.006 * * * −0.001 * * * 0.000 * * 0.001 −0.007 * * * (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) KZ Index 0.001 * * * −0.000 * * * −0.000 * * * 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) InstOwn 0.006 0.004 * * * −0.000 0.003 * * * −0.000 (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Tobin'sQ 0.008 * * * 0.003 * * * 0.002 0.003 * * * 0.002 * (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) KZ Index 0.002 * * * −0.000 * * −0.000 −0.000 * * −0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) and IV 2SLS (panel B) regression results of the effect of the number of analysts on CVC investments one and two years ahead. Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses. * * * , * * , and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1 .
LnCoverage 0.000 0.001 * * 0.007 * * * 0.007 * * * (0.001) (0.000) (0 ) and an indicator variable that equals 1 when firms match or beat analysts' forecasts on R&D spending, in the current period and one period after. We use several specifications including 1degree and 3-degree polynomials. Panel B exploits the discontinuity presented in panel A and uses a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to show the effect of firms' R&D cuts on firms' patents and citations three and four years later. We instrument the variable R&D cut with the indicator variable that equals 1 when firms match or beat analysts' forecasts. We use a small window of 10 cents around the EPS pressure threshold of 0. We include our usual firm-level controls in all regressions. We also control for the level of EPS pressure and its interaction with the indicator variable in panel B. Errors are robust and clustered at the firm level, and they are reported in parenthesis below the coefficients. * * * , * * , and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1 . by the end of the fiscal year as a function of EPS pressure measured by the distance between analysts' consensus forecasts and the actual firms' EPS. For every EPS pressure bin, the dots represent the probability of a cut in R&D -the proportion of firm-years that cut R&D from all the firm-years included in that bin (bins are of 2 cents). The lines are second-order polynomials fitted through the estimated probabilities on each side of the zero EPS pressure threshold. 32 we use the mergers of brokerage houses as an exogenous variation for analyst coverage. When two brokerage houses merge, the analysts from the two merging houses that were covering the same firms become redundant.
After the merger, the surviving house usually retires some of these analysts and, as a result, after the merger the firms that had been followed by the two merging houses lose one financial analyst. As shown by Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) , this loss in analyst coverage happens for reasons that are exogenous to the characteristics of the firms being covered. 33 We take the list of 15 mergers provided by Hong and Kacperczyk (2010), 34 and we keep the 13 mergers that occur during our sample period (between 1990 and 2011). Table B.1 shows a detailed list with the characteristics of the mergers used in this study. We use these 13 events to estimate a difference-in-differences (DID) model. Our DID model presents a slight variation with the typical DID methodology because we need to handle multiple events. We follow Gormley and Matsa's (2011) "stacking" approach to construct our sample of treated and control firms. Similarly, we first construct subsamples, or cohorts, of treated and control firms for each merger event. Thus, each cohort corresponds to a merger event.
We construct the cohorts in chronological order by taking into account the treated firms in the previous cohorts (see explanation below), and then we "stack" (or pool) the data across cohorts into one dataset that we will use for an estimation.
We construct each cohort as follows. For each merger event, we specify a three-month window around the merger month to account for the possibility that the merger event spanned several days or even a couple of months. Then, we use a 12-month period around this window to construct our group of treated firms. In each cohort, we classify a firm into the treated group if it was covered by both merging houses during the 12-month period before the merger window, that is, between 13 and 2 months before the merger month; and is continued to be covered in the 12-month period after the merger window, that is, between two and 13 months after the merger month. 35 For each merger, we construct a comparison 32 Derrien and Kecskes (2013), Chen, Harford, and Lin (2015), and Oesch (2013, 2016) . 33 In their study, Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) carefully verified that the broker house mergers were exogenous to the covered firms' characteristics. Wu and Zang (2009) also argue that when two brokerage houses merge, they typically let analysts go for reasons other than the characteristics of the firms they cover, such as merger turmoil and cultural differences in the broker houses. 34 Using the list of mergers provided by the authors allows us to make our analysis consistent with the various studies that use the same list, and to be sure that the merger events are due to characteristics that are exogenous to the affected firms. 35 To further ensure exogeneity, we drop all firms that were covered by both broker houses before the merger but are not covered by the surviving house afterwards as this termination decision could be endogenous. group of unaffected firms (firms that were not covered by both houses before the merger) that are present in the Compustat and in I/B/E/S databases during the event window for that merger. We use a five-year event window (two years pre-and two years post-merger) for our estimations, and hence, we require that our treated and control firms are active in Compustat and have coverage in the I/B/E/S detail file during the five-year window that corresponds to each merger. For the moment, we match firms based only on their presence in Compustat and I/B/E/S during the event window, but below we construct a group of control firms using a matching approach based on firm characteristics.
Since we use data for two years pre-and two years post-merger for our estimations, we need to address the possibility that some firm-years may overlap across two or more different events. The overlapping could be a problem if, for example, a firm appears as treated in a given year, and as a control in the same year for another event. This could happen for two mergers that occur either in the same year, or are one or two years apart. We address the possibility of overlapping as follows. Our first cohort (i.e., for merger 1 in year 1994) starts with a pool of previously untreated observations. 36 From this pool, we identify the treated firms and control firms as explained above. For the next cohort (i.e., merger 2 in year 1997), we first drop from the pool of treatment and control firm candidates the firms that we identified as treated in the previous merger, and then, from the remaining firms, we identify the treated and control firms for this merger. In general, for each cohort, we drop treated firms from previous mergers as long as the previous mergers are less than four years apart from the current one. In other words, a firm can be a control and can remain in the pool of candidate firms until it gets treated by a merger event, in which case it disappears from the sample of candidate firms for the next three years. After the three years, the previously treated firm is put back in the pool of candidates because there is no longer a risk of overlap. In the "stacked" sample, we end up with 503 treated firms and 2, 922 control firms. 37 The regression results using this sample are in Table 7 panel B.
We also construct a control group of firms using a matching technique. The results using the matched sample appear in Table 7 panel C. A matching approach is useful when one is concerned that the distributions of unobservable characteristics might be substantially different in the treatment and control samples. We match each treated firm to a set of control firms based on various firm-level characteristics measured in the previous year to the merger year. As matching variables, we choose the firm-level characteristics that determine 36 The merger before that occurred in 1988, which is more than 3 years apart from the merger in 1994. So it is not possible that our firm-year observations overlap. 37 Some observation units will appear multiple times in the data. For example, firm ABC might be a control in event year 1999 but a treated firm in a later event in 2005.
the inclusion of a firm into the treated group. These variables correspond to those used in the literature. We match firms on size, cash, R&D, profitability, leverage, PPE, and Tobin's Q using nearest neighbor propensity score matching. Specifically, we first estimate a logit regression in which the dependent variable equals one if a firm is treated in a given year, and zero otherwise; and the independent variables correspond to our set of matching variables. For the logit estimation, we use our panel of treated firms and the remaining firms in Compustat with valid matching variables as our control pool. Second, the estimated coefficients are used to predict propensity scores of treatment, which are then used to perform a nearest-neighbor match with replacement. We keep up to four matches per each treated firm. We end up with 229 treated and 418 control firms. Table B .2 presents a comparison of the ex-ante characteristics of the treated and control firms for the matched sample. As Table B .2 shows, the matching procedure eliminated most of the ex-ante differences in firms' observable characteristics. We use the matched sample to estimate equation (4) again, and report the results in Table 7 . The results in Table 7 show that analyst coverage significantly affects firms' innovation strategy. In particular, after a coverage termination shock, firms are less likely to cut R&D expenses, to start CVC funds, and to acquire firms. Also, when they acquire, they acquire a lower number of firms.
These results are consistent with our OLS and IV results, and the previous DID results.
The sign and magnitude of the coefficients in the matched sample (panel C of Table 7 ) are very similar to those in panel B of the same table, suggesting that potential unobservable characteristics were not causing large biases in our roughly matched sample. However, in the matched sample the significance is smaller, which might be due to the lower number of observations.
The success of the DID method relies on the so-called parallel trends assumption. This is a key identifying assumption that requires that, in the absence of treatment, the group of treated and control firms follow a similar trend. The fact that we rely on multiple treatment events is useful for mitigating concerns about the violation of the parallel trends assumption because it is hard to find a story that would argue that the parallel trends assumption is violated for each unique event. Nevertheless, we look for further support of this assumption by showing that there are no significantly different trends in the pre-event period for the two groups. Figure B .1 presents different plots of the point estimates of yearly regressions as specified in Equation (4) . Each plot corresponds to various regressions of our innovation input variables against a dummy variable that equals 1 for the treated firms. In each plot we present point estimates by year, from three years before to five years after the merger events. As can be seen in Figure B .1, there is no indication of change in the innovation strategy of treated firms relative to control firms prior to the mergers. However, the change in the treated firms' innovation strategy coincides with the merger event, as shown in our previous results. Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) . We include the names and dates of the merging brokerage houses as well as their I/B/E/S identifiers. values and standard errors, as well as the mean difference and t-statistic of the treated and control groups of firms in the matched sample one year before the merger event. We report the averages and difference for various firm characteristics included in our analysis. We match firms on size, cash, R&D, ROE, leverage, PPE and Tobin's Q using nearest neighbour propensity score matching.
* * * , * * , and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1 . Figure B .1: Effect of Merger Events on Innovation Strategy (Parallel Trends). This figure includes several graphs that report the point estimates from regressions of our various innovation inputs on a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that were affected by brokerage house mergers and 0 otherwise. The regressions follow the same specification as Equation (4) except that each point estimate corresponds to a different year, from three years before a merger event to five years after. We also include 95% confidence intervals.
Control group Treated group
B.2 Parallel trends of R&D activities in the EPS pressure analysis Negative EPS Pressure. This table reports results for pre-existing differences in R&D spending around the zero EPS pressure threshold (i.e., when EP SP = 0). The test is performed in a sample that consists of observations in a small window around the zero EPS threshold (between −0.1 and 0.1). We control throughout for the level of EPS pressure (i.e., EPSP), interacted with the indicator variable that equals 1 for matchers and beaters and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the firm level, and are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. * , * * , and * * * represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
